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ELLISON v. BRADY: A LEGAL COMPROMISE WITH REALITY IN
CASES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
After a brief discussion of work, he would turn the conver-
sation to a discussion of sexual matters.
His conversations were very vivid. He spoke about acts
that he had seen in pornographic films involving such matters
as women having sex with animals and films showing group sex
or rape scenes.
He talked about pornographic materials depicting individ-
uals with large penises or large breasts involved in various sex
acts. On several occasions, [he] told me graphically of his own
sexual prowess.'
Regardless of whether the allegations were true, the words sparked
public debate about sexual harassment of women in the workplace.
Although men also suffer from sexual harassment, most victims of sex-
ual harassment in the work environment are women.2 Women have in
1. Hill. The 'most difficult ... experiences of my life,' PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 12,
1991, at A7. This quote is part of a formal statement made by Anita Hill during
the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court Associate Justice Clarence Thomas.
Id. The Senate Judiciary Committee invited Hill, a professor of law at the Uni-
versity of Oklahoma, to testify at the hearings after she claimed that Thomas had
sexually harassed her. Id. According to Hill, the alleged harassment occurred
when she worked as an assistant for Thomas at the Department of Education
and then later at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Id.
2. Male victims of sexual harassment in the workplace account for only
"one-tenth of the number of cases filed [with the EEOC] by women." Neal
Templin, As Women Assume More Power, Charges Filed by Men May Rise, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 18, 1991, at B3. Such a discrepancy between the numbers of male and
female victims can be explained by the fact that "most sexual harassment cases
really aren't about sex, but power." Id. Women comprise 45.4% of the work
force in the United States, but women comprise less than this percentage in
most professional occupations. Barbara Marsh, Women in the Work Force, WALL
ST.J., Oct. 18, 1991, at B3 (compilation of statistics). For example, in 1990, only
40% of executive, administrative and managerial jobs were filled by women, and
only 8% of engineers, 36% of mathematicians and computer scientists, 19% of
physicians and 21% of lawyers and judges were female. Id. Furthermore, only
three women serve as chief executive officers of Fortune 500 Industrial and For-
tune 500 Service Companies, and only 56% of those companies have female
directors on their boards. Id. Therefore, because men continue to dominate the
corporate power structure, the gender of sexual harassment victims is usually
female. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN 9-10 (1979) ("[Tlhe sexual harassment of women can occur largely be-
cause women occupy inferior job positions and job roles; at the same time, sex-
ual harassment works to keep women in such positions.").
One lawyer has suggested that "more men will experience sexual harass-
ment over the coming years as women assume more positions of power in cor-
(195)
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fact suffered sexual harassment throughout history;3 the publicity which
surrounded Anita Hill's claim against Supreme Court nominee Clarence
Thomas only exposed the magnitude of the problem. Media polls con-
ducted during the hearing confirmed what many women already knew:
sexual harassment of women pervades the workplace4 and affects wo-
porate America," but today sexual harassment in the workplace is still a problem
faced predominantly by females. Templin, supra, at B3.
3. See Jill L. Goodman, Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the Distance
Travelled and the Distance Yet to Go, 10 CAP. U. L. REV. 445, 448 (1981). Until the
late 1800s, most women who worked outside the home were house servants. Id.
The males in these households often sexually harassed their female servants. Id.
Around the turn of the century, more women, mostly from poor back-
grounds,joined the workforce. Id. at 449. However, "[taking ajob was consid-
ered neither respectable nor something an honest woman would do, and women
who did so were considered to have given up their claim to gentle treatment.
The distinction between women who sold their labor and women who sold their
bodies was often not made." Id. Consequently, sexual harassment pervaded the
work environment of women; their powerlessness forced them to accede to the
threats and abuse of their male supervisors. Id. at 449-50.
This harassment has continued to persist throughout the twentieth century.
The term "sexual harassment" was first used in the 1970s to describe such dis-
criminatory, sex-related conduct in the workplace. Id. at 445; see also MACKIN-
NON, supra note 2, at 27-28 ("Until 1976, lacking a term to express it, sexual
harassment was literally unspeakable, which made a general, shared, and social
definition of it inaccessible. [But] [t]he unnamed should not be mistaken for the
nonexistent." (footnote omitted)).
4. During the hearings on Hill's claim, the New York Times, in conjunction
with CBS News, conducted a poll of 512 adults across the country. Elizabeth
Kolbert, Sexual Harassment at Work Is Pervasive, Survey Suggests, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
11, 1991, at Al. The results indicated that approximately 40% of the women
polled had experienced sexual harassment at work, and about half of the men
polled "said that at some point while on the job, they had said or done some-
thing that could have been construed by a female colleague as harassment." Id.
According to the results, "sexual harassment, even if largely unreported, is a
pervasive problem in the workplace." Id.
Other studies have previously demonstrated the pervasiveness of sexual
harassment of female workers in both the governmental and the civilian
workforce. See Goodman, supra note 3, at 453. For example, in a 1976 survey of
9,000 women, 90% claimed they had been sexually harassed at work. Id. at 452
(citing Joseph Safran, What Men do to Women on the Job, REDBOOK, Mar. 1976, at
149). In addition, a recent congressional study reported that 42% of female
federal employees experienced sexual harassment on the job. Wendy Pollack,
Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience v. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ.
35, 46 n.33 (1990) (citing U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 2 (1988)).
[Vol. 37: p. 195
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men in all professions 5 across the country. 6
Only recently, however, has sexual harassment emerged as a viable
cause of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 7 Conse-
quently, courts are still struggling over how to determine whether the
alleged conduct constitutes actionable sexual harassment. In particular,
courts are split over whether a defendant's conduct should be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable person or a reasonable victim of the
plaintiff's sex in determining whether such behavior establishes an ac-
tionable claim of sexual harassment.8
In Ellison v. Brady,9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
5. See Goodman, supra note 3, at 453 (quoting Sexual Harassment in the Federal
Government, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on Post
Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 64-66 (1979) (testimony of Helen
Lewis)). Sexual harassment cases reflect the variety of occupations in which
working women have been sexually harassed. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vin-
son, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (assistant bank manager); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872
(9th Cir. 1991) (internal revenue agent); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895
F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990) (police officers); Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d
881 (1st Cir. 1988) (surgical resident); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th
Cir. 1987) (secretary); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982)
(police dispatcher).
6. Goodman, supra note 3, at 453 ("[W]omen [are] affected by sexual har-
assment in every region of the country, and in both large and small cities." (cit-
ing Peggy Crull, The Impact of Sexual Harassment on the Job: A Profile of the Experiences
of 92 Women, WORKING WOMEN'S INSTITUTE RESEARCH SERIES, Report No. 3
(1979))).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). In general, Title VII requires plaintiffs
to file claims of sexual harassment with the EEOC. Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.7(a), .8 (1991)
[hereinafter EEOC Procedural Regulations]; see Tamar Lewin, A Case Study of Sex-
ual Harassment and the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1991, at A17. Based on the facts
of a particular case, the EEOC determines whether to file a claim against the
alleged harasser on behalf of the plaintiff. EEOC Procedural Regulations, supra,
§ 1601.21(a); see Lewin, supra, at A17.
The EEOC only litigates a small percentage of the claims it receives each
year. For example, in 1990 the EEOC received 5,694 complaints of sexual har-
assment but only filed suit in 50 of these cases. Lewin, supra, at A17. Plaintiffs
whose claims are rejected by the EEOC must employ a private attorney if they
wish to pursue their claim. Id. Because the EEOC accepts so few claims, and
because Title VII generally allows only back pay and/or reinstatement, many
lawyers by-pass the EEOC filing procedure and instead sue for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) (courts may
grant any type of equitable relief, including injunctions against prohibited con-
duct or orders for administrative action, "which may include, but is not limited
to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay").
8. Compare Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990)
(reasonable woman standard should be used in determining whether conduct
constitutes actionable sexual harassment under Title VII); with Brooms v. Regal
Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989) (dual standard combining subjective
viewpoint of victim and objective perspective of reasonable employee) and
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) (dual standard com-
bining subjective viewpoint of victim and objective perspective of reasonable
person), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
9. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Circuit tried to resolve this uncertainty. The Ninth Circuit held that a
reasonable victim standard' ° should be used in cases where employees al-
lege hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII. I I In so
holding, the Ninth Circuit rejected the application of the reasonable
person standard because it can be unfair to harassment victims in situa-
tions where sexually discriminatory conduct is the behavioral norm.' 2
In such cases, the court explained, a reasonable person might not per-
ceive a defendant's conduct as discriminatory, even though the conduct
would in fact establish an actionable claim of discrimination.' 3
The Ninth Circuit stated that the reasonable victim standard, how-
ever, avoids reinforcing established misconceptions of what behavior is
or is not discriminatory by considering the different perspectives of the
harassers and the victims.1 4 Such consideration, the court emphasized,
is important because in most sexual harassment cases women are victims
of male harassers, and women as a group "share [a] common [perspec-
tive] which men do not necessarily share."' 5 The court therefore ap-
10. The reasonable victim standard encompasses both the reasonable man
and reasonable woman standards; the use of the term "victim" indicates that the
gender of the victim determines the standard's perspective. Id. at 879. Courts
that have expressed the reasonable victim standard in terms of a reasonable
"woman" (i.e., a court which adopted the reasonable victim standard in a case
where the victim was female) will apply a reasonable "man" standard in cases
where the victim is male. See, e.g., id. at 879 n. 11 ("Of course, where male em-
ployees allege that co-workers engage in conduct which creates a hostile envi-
ronment, the appropriate victim's perspective would be that of a reasonable
man."); Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482 ("reasonable person of the same sex in that
position"); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987) (if victim
is male employee, "the 'reasonable man' standard should be applied"); Robin-
son v.Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1523 (M.D. Fla. 1991) ("a
reasonable person of [the plaintiff's] sex"). Therefore, in describing the stan-
dard, the term "reasonable victim" can be used interchangeably with the terms
"reasonable woman" or "reasonable man," depending on the gender of the
victim.
11. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. Courts have recognized two forms of sexual
harassment: quid pro quo and hostile environment. For an explanation of these
two forms of sexual harassment, see infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
Ellison concerns only hostile environment sexual harassment. Ellison, 924 F.2d at
875.
12. See Ellison, at 878-79.
13. Id. at 878.
14. Id. But see Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir.
1986) (reasonable person standard protects plaintiffs from sexual harassment as
well as defendants from spurious claims), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
15. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. The Ninth Circuit suggests that the reasonable
victim standard will benefit all harassment victims regardless of their sex in situ-
ations where discriminatory conduct would be perceived under the reasonable
person standard as nondiscriminatory. Id. at 878. However, most sexual harass-
ment charges are filed by female victims against male harassers because of the
power of men relative to the power of women in today's work force. See Lewin,
supra note 7, at A17 ("[M]ost of the cases involve women bringing charges
against men."). For a discussion of courts' focus on the female plaintiff, see infra
note 17.
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plied the reasonable victim standard (a reasonable woman standard
because the victim was female) to the facts of the case. The court con-
cluded that a reasonable woman in the plaintiff's position could have
considered the defendant's conduct "sufficiently severe and pervasive to
alter a condition of employment and create an abusive working
environment." 16
This Note discusses the emergence of hostile environment sexual
harassment as a basis for sex discrimination claims under Title VII. In
particular, it focuses on the different standards courts have adopted
when determining whether evidence of offensive conduct establishes an
actionable claim of hostile environment sexual harassment. Against this
background, the Ninth Circuit's rationale for adopting the reasonable
victim standard is analyzed. Finally, this Note analyzes the impact which
this standard will have on cases brought by female plaintiffs17 and on the
perceptions of men and women as to what constitutes acceptable sexual
behavior in the workplace.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIM UNDER TITLE VII
A. Emergence of the Sexual Harassment Claim
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination
"against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 8
The first sexual harassment cases to arise under Title VII involved
situations where women were fired for refusing to accede to their em-
ployers' sexual advances. t 9 Yet, many of these early claims were unsuc-
16. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880.
17. The Ninth Circuit in Ellison, as well as other courts which have adopted
the reasonable victim standard, concentrated its analysis on how the reasonable
victim standard will benefit female plaintiffs because women are victims of male
harassers in the majority of cases. Id. at 879; see also Andrews v. City of Philadel-
phia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990); Lewin, supra note 7, at A17. There-
fore, this Note focuses on the standard's impact in cases brought by female
plaintiffs while acknowledging that sexual harassment of men does exist, and
that male victims will also benefit from the reasonable victim standard.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2003-2(a)(1) (1988). Title VII also prohibits an employer
from "limit[ing], segregat[ing] or classify[ing] his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Congress added sex as a prohibited basis for employment discrimination
"at the last minute on the floor of the House of Representatives." Ellison, 924
F.2d at 875 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964)). As a result, courts have
little legislative history to rely on when interpreting Title VII's prohibition
against sex discrimination. Id.; see also Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
64 (1986).
19. Goodman, supra note 3, at 459. The first case to recognize a sexual
harassment claim under Title VII was Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654
5
Almony: Ellison v. Brady: A Legal Compromise with Reality in Cases of Sex
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
cessful because the language of Title VII does not explicitly prohibit
sexual harassment. 20 Consequently, courts initially rejected sexual har-
assment as a viable cause of action under Title VII.2 1 In fact, many cases
reveal that judges viewed the problem as a "personal matter, neither
employment-related nor sex-based."
22
In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
recognized sexual harassment as an actionable claim under Title VII.23
Additionally, the EEOC issued Guidelines 24 which defined two types of
sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile environment. 2 5 Quid pro
(D.D.C. 1976), rev'd in part on other grounds, vacated in part sub. noma. Williams v.
Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See Pollack, supra note 4, at 45-46 n.30. In
Williams, the plaintiff claimed that she had been fired for refusing her supervi-
sor's sexual advances. Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 655-56. The court held that
Title VII recognizes a cause of action for "alleged discriminatory imposition of a
condition of employment by [a] supervisor." Id. at 661. After reviewing the
administrative record, the court decided that substantial evidence rationally sup-
ported the conclusion that the defendant's sexual advances imposed "conditions
of employment" upon the plaintiff which were discriminatory on the basis of sex.
Id. at 663.
20. See Nicole D. Rizzolo, Comment, A Right with Questionable Bite: The Future
of "Abusive or Hostile Work Environment" Sexual Harassment as a Cause of Action for
Women in a Gender-Biased Society and Legal System, 23 NEw ENG. L. REV. 263, 265-66
n.13 (1988). Title VII only expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis of
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1988).
21. Rizzolo, supra note 20, at 265-66 n.13.
22. Pollack, supra note 4, at 46. For example, in Come v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (1975), rev'd on procedural grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir.
1977), the district court concluded that Title VII protects employees only from
discriminatory employment policies, such as those policies that result in discrim-
inatory hiring or job assigning. Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163. The court held that
sex-related conduct of an employer which is not done pursuant to discriminatory
employment policies does not fall within the Title VII prohibition. Id. Such
conduct, the court continued, is better characterized as "nothing more than a
personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism ... [for the satisfaction of] a per-
sonal urge." Id.; see also Goodman, supra note 3, at 459-60 ("Judges, seeing 'per-
sonal' rather than employment relationships and fearing a flood of claims,
balked at holding employers liable and refused to see discrimination on the basis
of sex in sexual harassment.").
23. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986); see Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1991) [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines] ("Harassment on the
basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of Title VII.").
24. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, § 1604. The Guidelines explain that
the EEOC analyzes claims of sexual harassment "on a case by case basis." Id.
§ 1604.11 (b). The EEOC must "look at the record as a whole and at the totality
of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context
in which the alleged incidents occurred." Id.
25. Rizzolo, supra note 20, at 267. Subsections (1) and (2) of § 1604.11(a)
of the Guidelines describe quid pro quo sexual harassment; subsection (3) de-
scribes hostile environment sexual harassment. See EEOC Guidelines, supra note
23, § 1604.11 (a). Although the Guidelines do not use the terms "quid pro quo"
or "hostile environment," courts have used these phrases to describe the two
types of sexual harassment under Title VII. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (us-
[Vol. 37: p. 195
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quo sexual harassment occurs when submission to unwelcome sexual
conduct, such as sexual advances or requests for sexual favors, "is made
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's em-
ployment," or "is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
[the] individual." 2 6 The Guidelines defined hostile environment sexual
harassment as unwelcome sexual conduct which "has the purpose or ef-
fect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environ-
ment."' 27 By recognizing hostile environment sexual harassment, the
EEOC sanctioned sex discrimination claims that were similar to the pre-
viously established racial and ethnic Title VII harassment claims based
on discriminatory work environments. 28
Although the Guidelines do not have the force of law, 29 they serve
"[a]s an 'administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing
agency.' "30 Thus, after the Guidelines were issued, federal district and
appellate courts uniformly relied on the Guidelines' interpretation of Ti-
tle VII sex discrimination in determining whether unwelcome sexual
ing "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" to differentiate between two
types of discriminatory sexual harassment).
26. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, § 1604.11(a)(1)-(2). Quid pro quo
harassment is characterized by a trade-off: the employer demands sexual favors
as a condition for granting employment security or advancement. Rizzolo, supra
note 20, at 268. To prevail upon a claim, a plaintiff must prove that he or she
had to "comply sexually [with the harasser's demands] or forfeit an employment
benefit." MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 32.
27. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, § 1604.11(a)(3).
28. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). A cause of action
for harassment resulting from a hostile work environment was first recognized in
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65; see Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
In Rogers, the plaintiff, an Hispanic woman, alleged that her employer, an
optometrical firm, discriminated against its Hispanic clientele. Rogers, 454 F.2d
at 236. The employer argued that its segregation of minority patients was not
directed toward its employees. Id. at 238. However, the court found that the
employer's discrimination against minority patients could have created a hostile
working environment for minority employees, including the plaintiff. Id. at 240-
41. This hostile environment formed the basis of the plaintiff's Title VII claim
against her employer for ethnic discrimination. Id. at 238.
The court reasoned that Title VII protection from discrimination with re-
spect to "terms, conditions and privileges" of employment extends beyond the
economic aspects of employment to include the working environment. Id.
Therefore, if the ethnic harassment had polluted the working environment, it
constituted unlawful discrimination under Title VII. Id. The court remanded
the case for a factual determination of whether the ethnic harassment had cre-
ated a discriminatory work environment. Id. at 241.
29. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 ("[W]hile not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority . . .[the Guidelines] constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance.") (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976),
and quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
30. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971)).
19921 NOTE
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conduct had created "hostile or abusive work environment[s]." 3'
B. Supreme Court Recognizes Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claim
In 1986, the Supreme Court validated Title VII sexual harassment
claims based on hostile work environments in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son.3 2 In rejecting the notion that Title VII is "limited to 'economic' or
'tangible' discrimination, ' 33 the Court interpreted "Title VII [as] af-
ford[ing] employees the right to work in an environment free from dis-
criminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."'3 4 In arriving at this
conclusion, the Court noted that ethnic or racial harassment that creates
a hostile work environment is a form of discrimination because it affects
"the emotional and psychological stability of minority group work-
ers."3 5 By analogy, the Court acknowledged that unwelcome sexual har-
assment has the same discriminatory impact when it creates a hostile or
abusive work environment.3 6 Quoting Henson v. City of Dundee,s 7 one of
31. Id. at 66; see, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983) (quot-
ing Guidelines for definition of hostile environment sexual harassment); Henson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 n. 7 (11 th Cir. 1982) (recognizing Guide-
lines as "well founded in Title VII principles previously enumerated by the
courts"); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting and
applying Guidelines to resolve hostile environment sexual harassment case).
32. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Plaintiff Vinson, an assistant manager at defend-
ant's bank, brought a hostile environment sexual harassment claim against her
supervisor and the bank. Id. at 60. Vinson testified that her supervisor "made
repeated demands upon her for sexual favors, usually at the branch, both during
and after business hours." Id. She acceded to her supervisor's demands for
sexual favors because she was afraid she would lose her job if she did not com-
ply. Id. During work hours, Vinson's supervisor also "fondled her in front of
other employees, followed her into the women's restroom when she went there
alone, exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occa-
sions." Id.
Based on these facts, the Court held that the plaintiff established "a viola-
tion of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex ha[d] created a
hostile or abusive work environment." Id. at 66. In so holding, the Court ex-
plicitly validated the hostile environment sexual harassment cause of action
under Title VII. See id.
33. Id. at 64. Quid pro quo sexual harassment claims are characterized by
"'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination." Id. at 65. The Court refers to hostile
environment sexual harassment as non quid pro quo. See id.
34. Id. (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980)).
35. Id. at 66 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)). Early sexual harassment cases focused on the
effect that the harassing conduct had on a plaintiff's psychological state to deter-
mine whether the conduct was "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to constitute
sexual harassment. Id. at 67; see Howard A. Simon, Ellison v. Brady: A "Reason-
able Woman" Standardfor Sexual Harassment, 17 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 71, 74 (1991).
For a discussion on how this focus changed after Meritor, see infra notes 46-47
and accompanying text.
36. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. The Court relied on the Fifth Circuit's rationale
in Rogers to explain why sexual harassment which creates a hostile environment
is a form of discrimination. Id.; see Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
37. 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982). In Henson, the plaintiff, a female police
202 [Vol. 37: p. 195
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the first cases to uphold a hostile environment sexual harassment claim,
the Court stated:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive en-
vironment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary bar-
rier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is
to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman
run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of be-
ing allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and
disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets. 38
Accordingly, the Court explicitly acknowledged that sexual harassment
may create a hostile work environment, and that such an environment
constitutes the basis for an actionable discrimination claim.
The Meritor Court cautioned, however, that sexually offensive con-
duct in the workplace does not always constitute actionable sexual har-
assment under Title VII. 3 9 Title VII sexual harassment claims are
limited to cases where a plaintiff can prove that he or she suffered un-
welcome sexual conduct which was "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to
alter the conditions of [the plaintiff's] employment and create an abu-
sive working environment.' ",40 For instance, the Meritor Court sug-
gested that a "mere utterance" that hurts an employee's feelings will not
be "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to uphold a sexual harassment
claim.4 1
The Court thus focused its analysis on the severity and pervasive-
ness of the sexual harassment, yet it did not examine from whose per-
spective the extent of the harassment should be determined. 4 2 The
Court merely stated that the success of a victim's harassment claim de-
pends upon whether the victim's working conditions have been ad-
versely affected by the harassing conduct. 4 3 Moreover, to make this
determination, the Court stated that the totality of the circumstances
dispatcher, brought a hostile environment sexual harassment claim against the
City of Dundee. Id. at 899. She alleged that her male supervisor had verbally
abused her with sex-related language. Id. As a result, "this harassment ulti-
mately led her to resign under duress." Id.
The court decided that the plaintiff had adequately proven that the verbal
harassment from her supervisor created a hostile environment. Id. at 905. The
harassment was "sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employ-
ment and create" a viable discrimination claim under Title VII. Id. at 904.
38. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 902).
39. Id. The allegations in Meritor "include[d] not only pervasive harassment
but also criminal conduct of the most serious nature." Id.
40. Id. (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904). For a discussion of Henson, see
supra note 37 and accompanying text.
41. Id. (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
42. See id.
43. See Simon, supra note 35, at 74 ("[T]he 'pervasive and severe' test goes
not to the effect of the harassing conduct on the victim, but to the conduct itself.")
1992] 203NOTE
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must be examined. 44 The Court emphasized, however, that the victim's
working conditions, not workplace conditions in general, should be con-
sidered in determining the presence of a hostile environment.
4 5
C. From Rabidue to Ellison: Courts Lack Consensus
Hostile environment sexual harassment cases prior to Meritor ana-
lyzed whether a defendant's conduct sufficiently altered the working
conditions to affect the psychological well-being of the plaintiff.46 Post-
Meritor cases shifted the analysis to whether an objective third party
could reasonably perceive the defendant's conduct as creating a hostile
environment. 4 7 These latter cases, however, demonstrate a lack of con-
44. Id. at 69. See EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, § 1604.11 (b) (EEOC will
consider "the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual ad-
vances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred"). In Meritor, the
Court found "that a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress" is rele-
vant to the totality of the circumstances analysis. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69.
45. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982)). In quoting Henson, the Meritor Court added the word
"victim" to modify employment. Id. Compare Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 ("to alter
the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment") with
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904) ("to alter the condi-
tions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment"). This addition indicates that the focus in determining whether
harassment has altered conditions of employment should be on the victim's work-
ing conditions, not on the environment of the workplace in general. See Meritor,
477 U.S. at 67. Therefore, although the Court did not explicitly state a stan-
dard, "[Meritor] approached hostile environment sexual harassment from the
subjective viewpoint of the particular plaintiff, and imposed the objective re-
quirement of notification to the harasser that his conduct is unwelcome." Nancy
Brown, Note, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: Clarifying the Standards of Hostile
Working Environment Sexual Harassment, 25 Hous. L. REv. 441, 457 (1988).
46. Simon, supra note 35, at 74. Decisions prior to Meritor "emphasized the
lack of any psychological injury to the plaintiffs arising from that conduct." Id.;
see, e.g., Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 ("Whether sexual harassment at the workplace is
sufficiently severe and persistent to affect seriously the psychological well-being of
employees is a question to be determined with regard to the totality of the cir-
cumstances.") (emphasis added).
47. See Simon, supra note 35, at 74-75. This shift in analysis introduces the
objective perspective of a reasonable third-party into the determination of
whether the defendant's conduct created a hostile work environment. See Elli-
son v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. City of Philadel-
phia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990) (Under "[t]he objective [standard] ...
the finder of fact must actually determine whether the work environment is sexu-
ally hostile."). In Ellison, the Ninth Circuit explained "that the 'pervasive and
severe' test goes not to the effect of the harassing conduct on the victim, but to
the conduct itself." Simon, supra note 35, at 74. The Ninth Circuit concluded that
conduct can be sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute sexual harassment
even though it has not seriously affected the victim's psychological state. Ellison,
924 F.2d at 878. The court reasoned that "employees need not endure sexual
harassment until their psychological well-being is seriously affected to the extent
that they suffer anxiety and debilitation .... Title VII's protection of employees
from sex discrimination comes into play long before the point where victims of
sexual harassment require psychiatric assistance." Id. (citation omitted). As a
204
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sensus as to whether a reasonable person or a reasonable victim stan-
dard should be used to evaluate the hostility of the workplace.
The first court to address the issue was the Sixth Circuit in Rabidue
v. Osceola Refining Co.,48 which initially adopted the reasonable person
standard.4 9 Specifically, the court held that the determination as to
whether alleged harassment creates a hostile work environment should
be made from the perspective of a gender-neutral reasonable person
under the same or similar circumstances, regardless of whether the
plaintiff is male or female. 50 The court thus decided that even though
result, the court held that the appropriate test for identifying valid hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment claims is one where the degree of hostility is deter-
mined from the objective viewpoint of the reasonable victim. Id. For a further
discussion of this shift from a subjective to an objective analysis of the work
environment's hostility, see infra notes 51, 90-96 and accompanying text.
48. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). In
Rabidue, the plaintiff worked for seven years "as the sole woman in a salaried
management position" at a refining company. Id. at 623 (Keith,J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). During that time, she frequently saw posters of nude
women displayed in the workplace and heard anti-female obscenities. Id. at 623-
24 (KeithJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part). In addition, the plaintiff was
denied management privileges that other managers received, including "free
lunches, free gasoline, a telephone credit card or entertainment privileges." Id.
at 624 (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
A majority of the court concluded: "[T]he obscene language and the sexu-
ally oriented posters did not rise to a level substantially interfering with the
plaintiff's work performance that created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
work environment .... " Id. at 623.
49. Id. at 620. If the plaintiff satisfies his or her burden of proof under the
reasonable person standard, he or she is then required to "demonstrate that [he
or] she was actually offended by the defendant's conduct and that [he or] she
suffered some degree of injury as a result of the abusive and hostile work envi-
ronment." Id.
In adopting the Sixth Circuit's Rabidue standard for hostile environment
sexual harassment cases, the Seventh Circuit described it as a "dual standard"
combining the objective perspective of the reasonable person with the subjective
viewpoint of the victim. See, e.g., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 419
(7th Cir. 1989). Designating the Rabidue standard as a "dual standard," how-
ever, is misleading because only the objective factor of the two-part test (i.e., the
reasonable person standard) goes to the determination as to whether the alleged
sexual harassment created a sufficiently hostile environment. See Andrews v.
City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990). Analysis of the plain-
tiff's subjective viewpoint serves only to establish that the plaintiff suffered some
kind of injury for which he or she can claim judicial relief. Id. ("The subjective
factor ... demonstrates that the alleged conduct injured this particular plaintiff
giving her a claim for judicial relief. The objective [standard], however, is the
more critical for it is here that the finder of fact must actually determine whether
the work environment is sexually hostile."). For a further discussion of the Sev-
enth Circuit's dual standard, see infra note 57.
50. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620. The court reasoned that although Title VII
was meant to provide women with an opportunity in the work force, it was not
"designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social mores of Ameri-
can workers." Id. at 621 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp.
419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984)). In other words, Title VII was merely intended to
give women an equal chance to obtain employment or promotions; it was not
11
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the plaintiff in Rabidue was female, she could prevail on her sexual har-
assment claim only by proving that a reasonable person, viewing the
facts from a gender-neutral perspective, would have perceived the de-
fendant's conduct as interfering with the work performance and "af-
fect[ing] seriously the psychological well-being of that reasonable
person." 5 1 The court concluded that applying the reasonable person
standard would protect "both plaintiffs and defendants." 52
The dissent in Rabidue, however, argued that the reasonable person
standard "fails to account for the wide divergence between most wo-
men's views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of men."'5 3 There-
fore, instead of protecting both defendants and plaintiffs, this standard
only protects the former by "sustain[ing] ingrained notions of reason-
able behavior fashioned by the offenders, in this case, men."'54 The dis-
sent asserted that a reasonable victim standard better protects all
interests involved. The victim's perspective recognizes the differences
in opinion between men and women, and the reasonableness require-
ment "shield[s] employers from the neurotic complainant." '55
Since Rabidue, four other circuits have addressed the issue of what
standard should be applied in sexual harassment cases, 56 but only the
meant to change work environments where sexual jokes and vulgarities are the
norm. Id. Contra Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1483 ("Congress designed Title VII to
prevent the perpetuation of stereotypes and a sense of degradation which serve
to close or discourage employment opportunities for women.").
51. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620. The court's directive that the fact-finder must
consider how seriously the defendant's conduct affected the plaintiff's psycho-
logical well-being as well as how it interfered with the plaintiff's work perform-
ance indicates that the court had not completely shifted away from pre-Meritor
cases, such as Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982), which
relied on the psychological well-being of the plaintiff as an indication of a hostile
environment. Cf Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878 ("It is the harasser's conduct which
must be pervasive or severe, not the alteration in the conditions of employ-
ment."). Ellison completely shifts the focus of analysis away from whether the
hostile conditions of employment were severe enough to affect the psychological
well-being of the plaintiff to whether the harasser's conduct was sufficiently se-
vere and pervasive to create a hostile work environment. See id. For a further
discussion of this shift in analysis, see supra notes 46-47, infra notes 90-96 and
accompanying text.
52. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620. The court explained that the reasonable per-
son standard protects defendants by preventing claims of harassment based on
behavior that would not offend reasonable individuals, even though the "plain-
tiff was actually offended by the defendant's conduct." Id.
53. Id. at 626 (Keith,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Com-
ment, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451 (1984) (advocating application of reasonable woman
standard in cases where plaintiff is female)).
54. Id. (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
55. Id. (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
56. Of the four other courts that have examined the issue, three of them
have adopted the reasonable victim standard. See infra note 61.
Although the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has not considered
whether the standard in hostile environment sexual harassment cases should be
206 [Vol. 37: p. 195
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Seventh Circuit has followed the reasonable person standard.5 7 Even
the Sixth Circuit has retreated from its Rabidue position; one year after
Rabidue, the Sixth Circuit rejected the reasonable person standard and
adopted the reasonable victim standard in Yates v. Avco. 58 The Yates ma-
jority quoted Rabidue's dissenting opinion and agreed that "men and
women are vulnerable in different ways and offended by different behav-
ior."'5 9 The court concluded that these differences were valid reasons
for analyzing sexual harassment claims from the perspective of a reason-
able man or a reasonable woman, depending on the victim's sex.
60
The other courts which have since adopted the reasonable victim
standard have relied on the same justifications that were invoked by the
a reasonable person or a reasonable victim, a district court in that circuit has
concluded that the appropriate perspective is that of a reasonable victim. See
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla.
1991). For a discussion of Robinson, see infra notes 65-69 and accompanying
text.
57. See, e.g., King v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533,
537 (7th Cir. 1990); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir.
1989). In Brooms, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
clarified its earlier holding in Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th
Cir. 1986), regarding what standard should be applied in hostile environment
sexual harassment cases. Brooms, 881 F.2d at 418. The court said a "dual stan-
dard" should be used in determining whether the alleged harassment had cre-
ated hostile working conditions. The subjective standard examines whether the
harassment adversely affected the particular plaintiff; the objective standard con-
siders "the likely effect of a defendant's conduct upon a reasonable person's ability
to perform his or her work and upon his or her well being." Id. at 419 (emphasis
added). Therefore, a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment may be
upheld "[o]nly if the court concludes that the conduct would adversely affect the
work performance and the well-being of both a reasonable person and the particu-
lar plaintiff bringing the action." Id. (emphasis added).
One other court, the Fifth Circuit, has applied the reasonable person stan-
dard to hostile environment sexual harassment claims, but its opinions have not
discussed why this standard is appropriate. See Waltman v. International Paper
Co., 875 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1989); Bennett v. Corroom Black Corp., 845 F.2d
104 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1988). The opinions merely state that
a reasonable person would or would not find particular conduct offensive. See,
e.g., Bennett, 845 F.2d at 106 ("Any reasonable person would have to regard
these [pornographic] cartoons as highly offensive to a woman who seeks to deal
with her fellow employees and clients with professional dignity and without the
barrier of sexual differentiation and abuse.").
58. 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987). Two female employees brought a sexual
harassment claim against their male supervisor. Id. at 631. The court addressed
the standard to be applied when it analyzed whether the harassment constituted
a constructive discharge of one of the plaintiffs. Id. at 636-37. The court said
the working conditions should be considered from the viewpoint of a "reason-
able woman." Id. at 636.
59. Id. at 637 n.2 (quoting Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith,J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part)).
60. Id. at 637 & n.2. Because the plaintiff in Yates was female, the court
applied the reasonable woman standard. Id. at 637. But the court noted that in
cases where the plaintiff is male, the appropriate objective standard would be
that of a "reasonable man." Id. at 637 n.2.
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Rabidue dissent,6 1 namely: (1) the divergence in men's and women's
views as to whether conduct is offensive mandates viewing the circum-
stances from the perspective generally shared by reasonable members of
the victim's gender;62 (2) the reasonable person standard reinforces ex-
isting stereotypes in discriminatory workplaces; 63 and (3) an objective
reasonable victim standard protects both the defendant-harasser and the
plaintiff-victim.
64
As recently as March 1991, in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. ,65
a district court in the Eleventh Circuit also adopted the reasonable vic-
tim standard. 66 In doing so, the Robinson court examined what evidence
should be relevant in determining how reasonable members of the
plaintiff's gender would perceive the defendant's conduct. The court
emphasized that the context, or working environment, in which the al-
leged harassment occurred is an important factor to consider.6 7 Conse-
61. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir.
1990) ("[Tjhe discrimination [must] detrimentally affect a reasonable person of
the same sex .... "); Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (lst Cir.
1988) (adopting reasonable woman standard to determine whether defendant's
sexual conduct was unwelcome); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.
Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991) ("The objective standard asks whether a rea-
sonable person of [the plaintiff's] sex, that is, a reasonable woman, would per-
ceive that an abusive working environment has been created.").
62. See, e.g., Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 898 ("[O]ften a determination of sexual har-
assment turns on whether it is found that the plaintiff misconstrued or over-
reacted to what the defendant claims were innocent or invited overtures.").
63. See, e.g., Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1483. The court suggested that a reason-
able woman standard in sexual harassment cases would "prevent the perpetua-
tion of stereotypes and a sense of degradation which serve to close or
discourage employment opportunities for women." Id.
64. Id. ("The objective [reasonable woman] standard protects the employer
from the 'hypersensitive' employee, but still serves the goal of equal opportunity
by removing the walls of discrimination that deprive women of self-respecting
employment.").
65. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991). In Robinson, the plaintiff, a female
welder at defendant's shipyard, frequently saw nude pictures and heard verbal
abuse of women. Id. at 1498. She also saw "abusive language written on the
walls in her working areas." Id. at 1499.
66. Id. at 1524. This standard is consistent with the standard applied by the
Eleventh Circuit in hostile environment cases based on racial harassment. See
Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989). In
Vance, an African-American female employee brought a hostile environment dis-
crimination claim based on race against her employer. Id. at 1508. The court
held that the existence of a hostile environment and its impact on the plaintiff's
working conditions should be determined from the perspective of a reasonable
minority employee. Id.
67. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1524. The court explained that "[w]hat may
appear to be a legitimate justification for a single incident of alleged harassment
may look pretextual when viewed in the context of several other related inci-
dents." Id. (quoting Vance, 863 F.2d at 1510-11). Thus, examination of the con-
text, or the totality, of the working environment is consistent with the notion
that "[a] hostile environment claim is a single cause of action rather than a sum
total of a number of mutually distinct causes of action to be judged each on its
own merits." Id. (quoting Vance, 863 F.2d at 1511).
[Vol. 37: p,. 195208
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quently, expert testimony which considers a defendant's conduct in the
abstract should be given little, if any, attention. 6 8 Only testimony of
psychologists who consider the plaintiff's work environment "provides a
reliable basis upon which to conclude that the cumulative, corrosive ef-
fect of this work environment over time affects the psychological well-
being of a reasonable woman placed in these conditions."' 69
Shortly after Robinson was decided, the Ninth Circuit in Ellison v.
Brady 70 addressed the issue of what standard should be used. The court
of appeals concluded that a reasonable victim standard should be used
in determining whether sexual harassment has created an environment
so hostile as to affect the working conditions of the plaintiff.7 1 In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court analyzed and rejected arguments advocat-
ing a reasonable person perspective and discussed its reasons for
adopting the alternative standard. 72
II. ELLISON v. BRADY: CASE DIscussION
In Ellison, a female Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent brought a
hostile environment sexual harassment claim against the Secretary of
the Treasury Department of the United States.73 Ellison, the plaintiff,
alleged that a male co-worker, Gray, began harassing her after she went
to lunch with him one day.74 Several months later, Gray gave Ellison a
note in which he expressed his romantic feelings for her.75 She did not,
however, bring the matter to the attention of her supervisors at that
time. Instead she asked another male co-worker to tell Gray that she
68. Id. Such evidence fails to consider the alleged conduct in the context of
the work environment. Id. Because courts must examine the totality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding alleged harassment when evaluating hostile environ-
ment claims, abstract studies have no value in the assessment of the hostility
created by the harassment. See id.
69. Id. at 1524-25. In Robinson, the plaintiff's expert witnesses based their
opinions on the reactions of women to conditions similar to those found in the
plaintiff's workplace. See id. at 1524. The court found this testimony relevant to
its analysis of the totality of the circumstances. Id.
70. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
71. Id. at 879. The court stated: "We . . .prefer to analyze harassment
from the victim's perspective." Id. at 878.
72. Id. at 875-81.
73. Id. at 873-75. The plaintiff appealed the district court's order granting
summary judgment for the defendant Secretary of the Treasury. Id. at 873.
74. Id. at 873. Gray "pester[ed] her with unnecessary questions and h[u]ng
around her desk." Id. Ellison tried to avoid him and declined his invitations for
lunch or for a drink. Id. at 873-74.
75. Id. at 874. The note said: "I cried over you last night and I'm totally
drained today. I have never been in such a constant term oil [sic]. Thank you
for talking with me. I could not stand to feel your hatred for another day." Id.
The note "shocked and frightened" Ellison, and she showed it to her supervisor.
Id.
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was not interested in him. 76
The next week Ellison left for a four-week training program in an-
other state. 77 She did not see Gray again before she left, but he mailed
her a "typed, single-spaced, three-page letter" in which he again ex-
pressed his interest in Ellison and said that he had been watching her.78
The letter upset Ellison, and she requested that either she or Gray be
transferred to another branch office. 79
Gray transferred to another office and Ellison returned to her origi-
nal workplace.80 However, Gray was given permission to return to the
office where Ellison worked after remaining in the other branch office
for six months.8 ' When Ellison heard about Gray's permission to re-
turn, she filed a complaint with the Treasury Department and, when her
complaint was rejected, appealed to the EEOC.8 2 After the EEOC re-
fused to take any action, Ellison filed a Title VII sex discrimination claim
in federal court against the Secretary of Treasury based on hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment.8 3
The federal district court found that Ellison failed to state an action-
able claim of hostile environment sexual harassment.8 4 On appeal, Elli-
son raised the following two issues: "(1) what test should be applied to
determine whether conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create a hostile working environment,
and (2) what remedial actions can shield employers from liability for sex-
ual harassment by co-workers." 8 5 This Note focuses only on the first
issue.8 6
76. Id. Initially, Ellison did not want her supervisor to do anything about
Gray's conduct because "[s]he wanted to try to handle it herself." Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. A portion of the letter read: "I know that you are worth knowing
with or without sex.... I have enjoyed you so much over these past few months.
Watching you. Experiencing you from 0 so far away. Admiring your style and
elan ...." Id.
79. Id. Ellison explained that she reacted in fear, saying, "I just thought he
was crazy. I thought he was nuts. I didn't know what he would do next. I was
frightened." Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. After he was transferred, "Gray filed union grievances requesting a
return to [his original] office. The IRS and the union settled the grievances in
Gray's favor," so he was permitted to return to the office where Ellison worked.
Id.
82. Id. at 874-75.
83. Id. at 875. The Treasury Department refused to take any action be-
cause it did not think Ellison's complaint resembled the description of sexual
harassment under the EEOC Guidelines. Id. When Ellison appealed to the
EEOC, the agency dismissed her complaint because it thought the Treasury De-
partment had taken adequate measures to remedy the situation. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 873.
86. The second issue examines whether an employer can shield himself or
herself from liability where the court concludes that the plaintiff suffered hostile
210 [Vol. 37: p. 195
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A. Majority Opinion Favors Reasonable Victim
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit began its
determination of the appropriate standard by explaining the origin of
the hostile environment sexual harassment claim.87 The Ninth Circuit
had examined the merits of only three sexual harassment claims since
the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor,88 and none of those cases an-
swered the question at hand: From whose perspective should the cir-
cumstances be viewed? Therefore, while these cases "establish[ed] the
framework" for analyzing Ellison's claim, they were not dispositive of
the issue. 89
In deciding which standard to adopt, the court first considered the
government's argument that it should apply a standard which would re-
quire that the defendant's conduct had an effect on "the plaintiff's psy-
environment sexual harassment. Id. at 882-83. Because the existence of hostile
environment sexual harassment must be affirmatively established before a court
considers the second issue of employer liability, this latter issue is not dispositive
as to what standard should be applied. Consequently, this Note focuses solely
on the first issue on appeal.
For a discussion of the liability issue, see generally Becky Leamon, Note,
Employers' Liability for Failure to Prevent Sexual Harassment, 55 Mo. L. REV. 803
(1990) (discussing Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989)); Kath-
leen A. Smith, Note, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: Inconsistency Under
Title VII, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 245 (1987) (discussing employer's liability for su-
pervisor's harassing behavior).
87. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 875.
88. Id. at 875-76. The first hostile environment sexual harassment claim
decided by the Ninth Circuit after Meritor was Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989). See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 875-76.
In Jordan and a subsequent case, Vasconcelos v. Meese, 907 F.2d 111 (9th Cir.
1990), the Ninth Circuit reviewed the lower court's factual findings and agreed
that they did not present evidence of conduct so severe or pervasive as to create
a hostile work environment. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 876 (discussingJordan and Vas-
concelas). Consequently, the Ninth Circuit upheld the two lower court decisions
because it "did not find [the district court's] factual findings clearly erroneous."
Id.
The Ninth Circuit, however, did affirm a claim of sexual harassment in
EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1984), where the defendant's
male chief of engineering made sexual passes at female employees. Ellison, 924
F.2d at 876 (discussing Hacienda Hotel). As the Ellison court noted, the court in
Hacienda Hotel agreed with the district court's determination that "the conduct
was sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter conditions of employment and cre-
ate a hostile working environment." Id.
89. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877. In Jordan, the court explained that the plaintiff
must prove the following elements to succeed on such a claim: (1) he or she was
subjected to sex-related verbal and/or physical conduct; (2) he or she did not
welcome such conduct; and (3) the conduct was so offensive that it altered his or
her working conditions "and create[d] an abusive working environment." Elli-
son, 924 F.2d at 875-76 (discussing Jordan).
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chological well-being." 90 The Ninth Circuit rejected this standard. 9 1
While agreeing that, to be actionable, the harassment must alter the
plaintiff's working conditions and create an abusive or hostile environ-
ment,9 2 the court nonetheless concluded that the severe or pervasive
determination goes to the defendant's conduct, not to the hostility of
the environment. 93 Otherwise, the court explained, employees would
have to wait until their work environment was so intolerable that it ad-
versely affected their psychological well-being. 94 Such a standard would
thwart the purposes of Title VII. As the court indicated, "Title VII's
protection of employees from sex discrimination comes into play long
before the point where victims of sexual harassment require psychiatric
assistance." 9 5 The court thus concluded that the fact-finder should fo-
cus on "the severity and pervasiveness" of the defendant's conduct to
determine whether it created a sufficiently hostile environment. 9 6
The court then turned to whether the defendant's conduct should
be viewed from the perspective of a reasonable person or a reasonable
victim. The court concluded that "the severity and pervasiveness of sex-
ual harassment" 9 7 should be evaluated from the reasonable victim's per-
spective because the reasonable person standard reinforces
90. Id. at 877. The court noted that such standards had been used by the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits in Rabidue and Scott, respectively. Id.; see Rabidue v.
Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 624 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir. 1986). For
example, in Rabidue, the Sixth Circuit explained that the fact-finder must ex-
amine the impact of the defendant's conduct on the psychological well-being of
the plaintiff if the plaintiff proves "that the defendant's conduct would have in-
terfered with a reasonable individual's work performance and would have af-
fected seriously the psychological well-being of a reasonable employee."
Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620. For a further discussion of Rabidue, see supra notes 48-
55 and accompanying text.
91. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877.
92. Id. at 878.
93. Id. Pre-Meritor cases, Rabidue and Seventh Circuit decisions analyzed
the hostility of the environment in terms of the effect of the defendant's conduct
on the plaintiff's psychological well-being and conditions of employment. Si-
mon, supra note 35, at 74; see, e.g., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th
Cir. 1989); Rabidue, 805 F.2d 611; Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11 th
Cir. 1982). The Ellison court, however, evaluated the hostility of the work envi-
ronment in terms of the pervasiveness and severity of the defendant's conduct
rather than the pervasiveness and severity of the conduct's effect on the victim
and her work conditions. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878. For a further discussion of
this shift in analysis, see supra notes 46-47, 51 and accompanying text.
94. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878. The court explained that "employees need not
endure sexual harassment until their psychological well-being is seriously af-
fected to the extent that they suffer anxiety and debilitation." Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The court "note[d] that the required showing of severity or serious-
ness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or fre-
quency of the conduct." Id. (citing King v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis.
Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990)).
97. Id.
212 [Vol. 37: p. 195
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discriminatory harassment.9 8 A reasonable person in circumstances
where harassment is the prevailing norm would consider such conduct
as commonplace and ordinary, not discriminatory. 99 Therefore, the rea-
sonable person standard actually validates the discriminatory status
quo.' 0 0 The end result is that "[h]arassers could continue to harass...
and victims of harassment would have no remedy."''
In contrast, the court explained that the reasonable victim standard
avoids reinforcing established stereotypes and discriminatory notions
because it recognizes differences in opinion between harassers and their
victims regarding what conduct is offensive. 10 2 Specifically, the court
emphasized the importance of considering the victim's perspective in
cases brought by female plaintiffs against male harassers.' 0 3 It noted
that women as a group "share common concerns [regarding sexual con-
duct] which men do not necessarily share."' 1 4 For example, sexual as-
sault raises concerns that are peculiar to women.1 0 5 Moreover, men
tend to view sexual conduct which women may find offensive not as dis-
criminatory but rather as "harmless amusement." 10 6 The court ex-
98. Id. The court quoted the EEOC Compliance Manual which states that
"courts 'should consider the victim's perspective and not stereotyped notions of
acceptable behavior.'" Id. (quoting EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 3112 (1988)).
The court's rationale parallels the reasoning in other cases, such as Yates,
which have applied the reasonable victim standard. See id. at 879. In fact, the
court quotes Lipsett, Yates, Andrews and the Rabidue dissent to justify its adoption
of the reasonable victim standard. Id. at 878. For a discussion of these cases,
see supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
99. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878-79.
100. Id. at 878. When a court uses the reasonable person standard, it
"run[s] the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination." Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 879. Some scholars have reached the same conclusion that men
and women have differing opinions about what conduct is appropriate in the
workplace. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 4, at 52 n.56 (citing John Pryor &Jeanne
Day, Interpretations of Sexual Harassment: An Attributional Analysis, 18 SEX ROLES
405, 405-17 (1988)).
105. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. The court reasoned that sexual conduct is a
bigger concern to women than men because women are most often the "victims
of rape and sexual assault." Id. In fact, the court noted that "[i]n 1988, an esti-
mated 73 of every 100,000 females in the country were reported rape victims."
Id. n.10 (citing FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1988 at 16 (1989)). The court
explained that this disproportionate impact of sex-related crimes on women may
also result in men and women perceiving sexual conduct differently:
Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual harassment may under-
standably worry whether a harasser's conduct is merely a prelude to
violent sexual assault. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault,
may view sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the
social setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman may
perceive.
Id. at 879.
106. Id. (citing Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation
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plained that these differences in perspective between men and women
justify viewing the work environment from the perspective of the vic-
tim.107 According to the court: "[A] sex-blind reasonable person stan-
dard tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the
experiences of women."' 0 8 Furthermore, the reasonableness require-
ment sufficiently protects employers "from having to accommodate the
idiosyncratic concerns of the rare hyper-sensitive employee."' 10 9
After explaining its reasons for adopting the reasonable victim stan-
dard, the court addressed two counterarguments against it. First, the
court dismissed the argument that the reasonable victim standard "es-
tablish [es] a higher level of protection for women than men." 11 0 On the
contrary, the court held that a standard incorporating a reasonable wo-
man's perspective promotes a "gender-conscious examination of sexual
harassment [which] enables women to participate in the workplace on an
of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1203 (1989)). In Lipsett v. University
of Puerto Rico, the First Circuit provided this example of how men and women
may view the same sexual conduct differently: "A male supervisor might believe
•.. that it is legitimate for him to tell a female subordinate that she has a 'great
figure' or 'nice legs.' The female subordinate, however, may find such com-
ments offensive." Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir.
1988).
107. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 & n.ll.
108. Id. at 879.
109. Id. The Rabidue court had also been concerned about "over-sensitive"
or "neurotic" employees, and it used this concern as a justification for adopting
the reasonable person standard. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611,
624 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
110. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. The majority cited a prior decision by the
Ninth Circuit as being sufficiently analogous to support its conclusion that a rea-
sonable woman standard does not provide heightened protection for women be-
cause of their sex. Id. (citing Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th
Cir. 1971)). In Rosenfeld, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether em-
ployment policies that discriminate on the basis of sexual characteristics, where
sexual characteristics are not a "bona fide" occupational necessity, violate Title
VII. Rosenfeld, 444 F.2d at 1224-25. The court decided this issue affirmatively,
and the amended Guidelines followed the court's rationale: "Label[s]-'Men's
jobs' and 'Women's jobs'-tend to deny employment opportunities unnecessa-
rily to one sex or the other." EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, § 1604.2(a); see
Rosenfeld, 444 F.2d at 1225. By prohibiting employers from denying employ-
ment opportunities to women because of their female characteristics, the court
and the Guidelines are not exercising a higher, more paternal level of protection
for women than for men. Rather, such an interpretation of the statute effectu-
ates its purpose by providing women with an equal opportunity to compete for
employment based on their individual characteristics rather than on their sexual
attributes. Rosenfeld, 444 F.2d at 1225. Similarly, a reasonable person standard
does not "establish a higher level of protection for women than men." Ellison,
924 F.2d at 879. On the contrary, it eliminates barriers, both verbal and physi-
cal, to employment opportunities, thereby allowing women to compete on equal
footing. Id. In both instances, women are not receiving special treatment-they
are merely being given the chance to do what they would otherwise not be able
to do (i.e., compete on equal footing) if the sexual barriers were not removed.
20
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equal footing with men." I I1
Secondly, the court explained that whether a harasser knows his
conduct is offensive to the reasonable victim is not an issue in these
cases because "Title VII is not a fault-based tort scheme."" t2 In other
words, if a co-worker or employer unknowingly acts in a way that offends
a reasonable woman, he would be liable for sexual harassment provided
that the conduct was unwelcome." 13 Title VII seeks to end discrimina-
tory conduct by focusing not upon the harasser's motivation but upon
how that conduct affects the work environment.' 14 Hence, "[t]o avoid
liability under Title VII, employers may have to educate and sensitize
their workforce" so that all employees know what conduct "a reasonable
victim would consider unlawful sexual harassment.""t 5
The court acknowledged that men and women could perceive the
facts in Ellison differently."16 A man in the harasser's position might
perceive the conduct as an attempt to flirt with Ellison." t7 Yet the same
conduct "shocked and frightened" the female plaintiff."t 8 Such differ-
111. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. A standard which promotes an equal oppor-
tunity for women in the workplace is consistent with the goal of Title VII: to
"afford[] employees the right to work in an environment free from discrimina-
tory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 65 (1986).
112. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880.
113. Id. The court noted in a footnote that "[ilf sexual comments or sexual
advances are in fact welcomed by the recipient, they, of course, do not constitute
sexual harassment. Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination in employment
does not require a totally desexualized workplace." Id. at 880 n. 13.
In Meritor, the Supreme Court explained that "[t]he gravamen of any sexual
harassment claim is that alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome.'" Meritor,
477 U.S. at 68 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)). A determination as to
whether the sexual advances were unwelcome is an issue of fact. Id. If the plain-
tiff's "conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome,"
then the plaintiff has a valid claim of sexual harassment so long as she can prove
that the advances created a hostile environment. Id. The Court cautioned that
evidence of a plaintiff's voluntary participation in the sexual conduct is not a
defense to a sexual harassment claim; rather, such evidence is relevant "as a
matter of law in determining whether he or she found particular sexual advances
unwelcome." Id. at 69.
114. Elison, 924 F.2d at 880 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 239
(5th Cir. 1971)).
115. Id. (citing EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, § 1604.11(0).
116. Id.
117. Id. The court noted that the district court's characterization of the
harassment as "isolated and trivial" appears fair when the facts are viewed from
Gray's perspective. Id. Gray had written Ellison a love letter, had shown no
animosity toward her and had offered to leave her alone. Id. Thus, Gray might
have envisioned himself "as a modern-day Cyrano de Bergerac wishing no more
than to woo Ellison with his words." Id. The court concluded, however, that a
reasonable woman in Ellison's position could have perceived his conduct as cre-
ating a hostile work environment. Id.
118. Id. The reaction of Ellison's female supervisor, Bonnie Miller, to
Gray's conduct supports the conclusion that a reasonable woman would have
considered the severity and pervasiveness of Gray's conduct sufficient to create a
21
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ent views, the court said, demonstrate why a reasonable victim's per-
spective is necessary to achieve a nondiscriminatory work environment
in situations where workplace conduct is based upon "ingrained notions
of reasonable behavior fashioned by the offenders.""l 9
After reviewing the facts, including the harasser's repeated expres-
sions of love and "references to sex," the court concluded that "[a] rea-
sonable woman could consider [the harasser's] conduct ... sufficiently
severe and pervasive to alter a condition of employment and create an
abusive working environment."' 120 The court therefore reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for
trial. 12 1
B. The Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, District Court Judge Stephens' 2 2 rejected
the reasonable victim standard primarily for the same reasons which
prompted the majority to accept it.123 First, the dissent interpreted Ti-
tle VII as mandating equal treatment of employees in a "gender neu-
tral" workplace.' 24 To achieve this neutrality, the dissent thought that
courts should adopt a neutral standard, such as the reasonable " 'vic-
tim,' 'target,' or 'person' " standard. 125 Such a standard, the dissent ar-
gued, "will meet the needs of all who seek recourse under this section of
hostile environment. Id. After Ellison informed her about Gray's "love letter,"
Miller called her boss, spoke with Gray about his conduct and told the personnel
department about the problem. Id. at 874. Miller's actions and her "prompt
response suggests that she did not consider the conduct trivial." Id. at 880.
119. Id. at 881 (citing Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st
Cir. 1988) and quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir.
1986) (Keith,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987)).
120. Id. at 880. In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly rejected
any suggestions that Ellison was an overly sensitive co-worker. Id.
121. Id. at 883-84.
122. Judge Stephens was sitting by designation for the court of appeals. Id.
at 873.
123. Id. at 884 (Stephens,J., dissenting). Because Ellison was appealing the
grant of the Treasury Department's motion for summary judgment, Judge Ste-
phens thought the record provided insufficient information upon which to base
a new standard. Id. (Stephens, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, he explained his
disagreement with the majority's adoption of the reasonable woman standard in
his dissenting opinion. Id. (Stephens, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Stephens, J., dissenting). Judge Stephens said Supreme Court
"preference against systems that are not gender or race neutral, such as hiring
quotas," supported his argument that Title VII promotes a gender-neutral work-
place. Id. (Stephens, J., dissenting) (citing City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1988)).
125. Id. (Stephens, J., dissenting). Judge Stephens' use of the word "vic-
tim" as a possible neutral standard differs from those cases which have used the
phrases "reasonable victim" and "reasonable woman" synonymously to de-
scribe the reasonable victim standard. For a discussion of the difference be-
tween the two phrases, see supra note 10.
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Title VII, ''1 2 6 not only women. 12 7 Secondly, the dissent rejected the
presumption that men and women necessarily perceive sex-related con-
duct differently. According to the dissent, this presumption, as well as
the notion that the reasonable victim standard is objectively reasonable,
is unsupported by evidence.1 28
The dissent then argued that the better approach would examine
only "the conditions of the workplace itself ... as affected, among other
things, by the conduct of the people working there as to whether the
workplace as existing is conducive to fulfilling the goals of Title VII.' 29
This approach, the dissent explained, would obviate the need to ex-
amine competing viewpoints, and instead, it would require employers to
recognize gender differences and to alter inappropriate conduct in
workplaces where one sex predominates.13 0
III. ANALYSIS
By adopting the reasonable victim standard in hostile environment
sexual harassment cases, the Ninth Circuit took an important step to-
ward the elimination of sex discrimination in the workplace.' 3 '
Although this step is not free from stumbling blocks, at the very least it
will contribute toward mutual understanding between genders in the
workplace.
The adoption of a reasonable victim standard for sexual harassment
is most significant in typical harassment cases involving female plaintiffs
and male defendants because it recognizes a reality that the reasonable
person standard ignores: women and men perceive the appropriateness
126. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 884 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
127. In making this assertion, the dissent ignores the fact that the reason-
able victim standard, as adopted by the majority, would also apply to male plain-
tiffs. See id. at 885 (Stephens, J., dissenting). In such cases, the court would
apply a reasonable man standard rather than a reasonable woman standard. Id.
at 879 n.ll.
128. Id. at 884 (Stephens,J., dissenting). The dissent does not say the pre-
sumption that men and women have different perspectives is always inaccurate.
Id. (Stephens, J., dissenting). Rather, Judge Stephens says men and women do
not "necessarily" view situations differently. Id. (Stephens, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Stephens, J., dissenting). The dissent's approach would resemble
pre-Meritor cases which focused on whether workplace conditions had been suffi-
ciently altered to affect the plaintiff's psychological well-being rather than on
whether the defendant's conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive to create
an objectively hostile environment. See Simon, supra note 35, at 74; see also Hen-
son v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Whether sexual
harassment at the workplace is sufficiently severe and persistent to affect seri-
ously the psychological well-being of employees is a question to be determined
with regard to the totality of the circumstances.") For a further discussion of the
focus of analysis in earlier hostile environment sexual harassment cases, see
supra note 46-47 and accompanying text.
130. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 885 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
131. For a discussion of the pervasiveness of sexual harassment in the
workplace, see supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
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of sexual conduct in the workplace differently.13 2 Although the dissent
dismissed this fact as an unsupported presumption, these differing per-
spectives have been widely recognized.' 3 3 In fact, the enraged reaction
of women to the disposition of sexual harassment allegations against the
Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas, now Justice Clarence
Thomas, supports the proposition that the genders view situations dif-
ferently.' 3 4 Moreover, the biased treatment of early sexual harassment
claims by male-dominated courts also reveals the gender difference re-
garding sexual conduct in the workplace.' 3 5
132. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Work-
place Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989). Male perspectives "contribute, either
intentionally or negligently, to the subordination of women" and are therefore
not "appropriate sources for an employer's or a judge's perspective." Id. at
1206 n.103.
133. For discussion of the difference in perspective between men and wo-
men regarding sexual conduct, see supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
See also Pollack, supra note 4, at 52 n.56 ("Women and men often interpret the
same behavior differently. In 'ambiguous' cases, e.g., a positive verbal comment
about one's physical appearance, women are more likely to perceive harm than
men." (citing John Pryor & Jeanne Day, Interpretations of Sexual Harassment: An
Attributional Analysis, 18 SEx ROLES 405, 405-17 (1988))); Rizzolo, supra note 20,
at 268 ("same actions perceived by women as offensive and sexually harassing
are seen by some men as harmless and innocent").
The large number of women who claim they have experienced sexual har-
assment in the workplace also suggests that many men do not consider their
sexual conduct offensive. But see Kolbert, supra note 4, at A l (half of men polled
admit "having said or done something that could have been construed by a fe-
male colleague as harassment"). Of course, the underlying premise in this argu-
ment is that at least some men would change their conduct if they knew that it
was sexually offensive to women. Cf Brown, supra note 45, at 456 n.123 ("It is
assumed that most supervisors will behave reasonably once an employee has
indicated that the behavior is unwelcome."). This realization requires men to
understand a reasonable woman's perspective. For a discussion of how to sensi-
tize the workforce so that men can understand a reasonable woman's viewpoint,
see infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
134. Female legislators, lobbyists, scholars and reporters attacked the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, composed entirely of males, for initially ignoring Anita
Hill's charges of sexual harassment against a Supreme Court nominee, now
Supreme Court Associate Justice Clarence Thomas. Allegations Highlight Hidden
Sex Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1991, at Al. They claimed that the Senators' lack
of initial consideration of Hill's complaint reveals the insensitivity of men toward
women's concerns. Id. Katherine T. Bartlett, a Duke University law school pro-
fessor, summarized the perceived problem when she said:
There's an astounding strength of feeling about this .... There's a
sense that there's a gap in male understanding, in the understanding of
the people making the decisions. There is a perception that a group of
men may not have taken this as seriously as a group of women similarly
situated would have taken it.
Id. (quoting Katherine T. Bartlett).
135. Cf Pollack, supra note 4, at 46. Before 1976, when sexual harassment
was first recognized as a legal claim under Title VII, "courts treated sexual har-
assment in the workplace as a personal matter, neither employment related nor
sex-based." Id. Even after 1976, some courts still refused to find actionable
sexual harassment in the most obvious cases. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref.
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Recognition of a woman's perspective is therefore not only fair but
logical. Only legal standards which reflect reality most accurately can
provide victims with fair remedies. Without such standards, victims will
remain lost in a system which regularly ignores their experiences. The
reasonable victim standard reflects the current gap in understanding be-
tween men and women regarding sexual conduct in the workplace.
Therefore, this standard "shape[s] [the law] so that what really happens
to women, not some male vision of what happens to women, is at the
core of the legal prohibition."' 136
As the law incorporates women's perceptions of certain conduct,
the reality of women's experiences in the workplace will be recog-
nized. 13 7 Consequently, the courts will be more "willing to give a lib-
eral construction to the Guidelines and case law, to accept the woman's
perspective, and to find actionable sexual harassment."' 138 Meanwhile,
the standard's reasonableness requirement allows for changes in wo-
men's perspectives toward sexual conduct.139
Although the theory behind the reasonable victim standard is co-
gent, whether it will work as a practical matter is questionable. The
standard confronts male jurors and judges with the problem of recon-
Co., 805 F.2d 611, 623 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) (no sexual harassment in situation where "female employees were ex-
posed daily to displays of nude or partially clad women" and male supervisor
"regularly spewed anti-female obscenity"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
136. Pollack, supra note 4, at 42 (quoting MAcKINNON, supra note 2, at 26).
137. See id. The fact that Ellison represents a consensus of the courts which
have so far addressed the issue of the appropriate standard in sexual harassment
cases suggests that the law is moving toward recognition of women's exper-
iences. For a discussion of how the circuits have decided this issue, see supra
notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
138. Pollack, supra note 4, at 48. The fact that the Ninth Circuit adopted
the reasonable victim standard in Ellison is significant because the alleged sexual
harassment in that case was arguably less severe and pervasive than the conduct
in other cases where hostile environment sexual harassment has been found.
See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982) (female dis-
patcher daily subjected to crude and abusive language and to inquiries about her
sexual practices); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (female welder witnessed numerous pictures and drawings of
nude women and was subjected to verbal abuse on daily basis). Despite the
lesser showing, the Ellison court still found sexual harassment under the reason-
able victim standard. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880. The court's willingness to adopt a
reasonable victim standard under the facts in Ellison thus represents an increased
sensitivity toward the female perspective.
139. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 n.12. In Ellison, the Ninth Circuit explained
that a reasonableness standard provides a flexible analysis which can incorporate
future changes in women's attitudes toward sexual conduct. Id. The court
stated: "As the views of reasonable women change, so too does the Title VII
standard of acceptable behavior." Id.; cf Pollack, supra note 4, at 42 (quoting
MAcKINNON, supra note 2, at 26) ("The strictures of the concept of sex discrimi-
nation will ultimately constrain those aspects of women's oppression that will be
legally recognized as discriminatory. At the same time, women's experiences,
expressed in their own way, can push to expand that concept.").
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ciling their view of reality with that of a reasonable woman. Conse-
quently, hostile environment sexual harassment cases might require
expert testimony to establish what a reasonable woman would think in a
given situation. 140 The price of litigating a sexual harassment claim
could increase, possibly resulting in a reduction in the number of female
employees who seek relief from sexual harassment.141 What looks like a
good standard in theory might therefore be difficult to implement in
practice.
Despite this drawback, the standard will most likely have a benefi-
cial, preventive impact. It will alert employers about their responsibility
to create a nondiscriminatory environment for all of their employees,
regardless of their sex. 142 Consequently, the standard will encourage
employers to "educate and sensitize their workforce to eliminate con-
duct which a reasonable victim would consider unlawful sexual harass-
ment."' 143 Such a result will ultimately recognize the EEOC's directive:
140. See, e.g., Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1524. In Robinson, each party em-
ployed two psychologists who testified about how a reasonable woman would
perceive the circumstances of that case. Id. The court rejected the testimony of
the defendant's psychologists, who only testified as to how women react to of-
fensive conduct in the abstract (they discussed the "level of offensiveness to wo-
men of pornographic materials" in a clinical study). Id. However, the plaintiff's
psychologist discussed the effects of sexual stereotyping on women who had ex-
perienced work environments similar to the plaintiff's situation. The court de-
cided that this testimony of the plaintiff's psychologists "provide[d] a reliable
basis upon which to conclude that the cumulative, corrosive effect of this work
environment over time affects the psychological well-being of a reasonable wo-
man placed in these conditions." Id.
141. The court's reliance on extensive expert testimony in Robinson sug-
gests an increase in litigation costs are possible. For a discussion of the Robinson
court's reliance on expert testimony, see supra note 140. If the potential relief
seems small in comparison to the potential costs upon losing, plaintiffs will be
unlikely to file claims. For a discussion of the relief available under Title VII, see
supra note 7. This conclusion becomes even more plausible if plaintiffs consider
the possibility that, upon losing, they might have to pay the defendant a "rea-
sonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988).
If, however, lawyers perceive the reasonable victim standard as improving a
plaintiff's chances of winning, the increased litigation costs will not dissuade
claims. Rather, the standard could have the opposite effect of actually increasing
litigation. Nonetheless, the ultimate problem of getting male jurors and judges
to stand in the shoes of a reasonable woman should make plaintiffs' lawyers
think twice before assuming they have an "easy" case.
142. Simon, supra note 35, at 78 ("Employees can no longer safely assume
that sexual conduct in the workplace is acceptable simply because it seems
'harmless' or 'in good fun' from a male perspective.").
143. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880; see also Simon, supra note 35, at 78-79. Simon
suggests guidelines that employers should follow to avoid liability, including the
following: (1) "[e]stablish a policy" that informs employees about what conduct
is considered offensive in the workplace and about what they can do if they have
a complaint; (2) "[c]onsider the victim's perspective" in evaluating a female em-
ployee's complaint; and (3) "[t]ake prompt and forceful remedial action." Si-
mon, supra note 35, at 78-79.
Simon notes that "[t]he reasonable woman standard will render some previ-
ously commonplace conduct actionable." Id. However, "fears that sexual har-
[Vol. 37: p. 195220
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"Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual
harassment." 144
IV. CONCLUSION
Although no one solution will eradicate sexual harassment in the
workplace, the adoption of the reasonable victim standard most accu-
rately addresses it. The standard recognizes the different perspectives
of men and women and attempts to reconcile them with legal reality. It
also deals fairly with the complainant and the alleged harasser by ensur-
ing that valid, reasonable claims are redressed. And regardless of
whether the standard can be practically applied, it has the preventive
impact of encouraging employers to implement a harassment policy and
educate their employees about what conduct is appropriate in the work-
place.
PatriciaJ Almony
assment law will 'chill' social relationships" are unfounded. Brown, supra note
45, at 454 n.l 10. Men and women will still enjoy friendly relationships in the
workplace. In fact, an open dialogue between men and women about what con-
duct is offensive could improve the quality of these relationships. Id. "All that is
required is a higher degree of disclosure of reaction by women and a higher
degree of attention to that reaction by men." Id.
144. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 23, § 1604.1 1(f). The Guidelines
continue:
An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harass-
ment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expres-
sing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing
employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harass-
ment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all
concerned.
19921
27
Almony: Ellison v. Brady: A Legal Compromise with Reality in Cases of Sex
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss1/6
